AUKUS Partners Respond to IAEA in September 2026: UK Right of Reply Explained

Chair,

I wish to address the assembly on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States to firmly reject the assertions that have just been presented regarding Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS agreement. Australia’s decision to pursue this capability is entirely in line with both the letter and spirit of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the overarching global safeguards framework.

We have heard statements intended to create uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of this initiative. These unsubstantiated claims suggest a compliance issue where none exists, and it is clear that China has repeatedly used this agenda item to further a political narrative.

The persistent inclusion of this matter undermines the rights of all Member States to engage directly and confidentially with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on safeguards and verification arrangements. For these reasons, it is imperative that we openly address this item at each Board meeting to counter such interference and identify it for what it truly is.

Concerns Over Political Motives

We continue to question the relevance of the item put forward by China. It appears to be politically motivated and has failed to achieve consensus. Moreover, it unnecessarily extends the duration and costs of the Board’s operations, while also undermining the Director General’s independent technical mandate concerning Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion programme. Such developments do not serve the interests of any of our nations.

Chair, the Board has encountered numerous allegations that disregard the information provided in good faith by AUKUS partners, and which contradict the statements made by the Director General.

The facts are unequivocal: AUKUS partners are fully adhering to their respective international obligations, including those outlined in the NPT, the Treaty of Rarotonga and its Protocols, as well as Australia’s IAEA safeguards agreements.

Understanding the Safeguards Framework

The IAEA Statute empowers the Agency to negotiate safeguards and verification arrangements directly and confidentially with Member States. Any political interference, as has been suggested, would significantly undermine the Agency’s independence and technical authority, which should be a concern for all of us.

Naval nuclear propulsion was anticipated by the drafters of the NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/153), which serves as the foundation for Australia’s own agreement, explicitly allows States Parties to utilise nuclear material for naval nuclear propulsion within the safeguards framework.

The NPT allows for the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level, provided that it is not intended for nuclear weapons and is conducted in accordance with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s programme will be subject to a comprehensive suite of safeguards and verification measures, consistent with its enduring non-proliferation commitments. The Article 14 arrangement will enable the IAEA to continue fulfilling its technical objectives.

Transparency and Engagement with the Board

Once an Article 14 arrangement is finalised between Australia and the IAEA Secretariat, it will be presented to the Board for appropriate action. Any claims suggesting that the Board will be bypassed are categorically false.

In contrast to the unfounded assertions we have encountered, AUKUS partners have been transparent in informing this Board about our efforts to assist Australia in preparing to operate conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.

As previously conveyed to the Board, submarine visits from the UK and US to Australia, including through the Submarine Rotational Force-West commencing in 2027, are crucial for equipping Australia to operate, maintain, and secure nuclear-powered submarines. Gaining direct experience alongside AUKUS partners is the most effective means of developing this capability. These visits are fully compliant with the international obligations of AUKUS partners, and we will provide further updates to the Board on recent developments under Any Other Business.

Commitment to Ongoing Updates

Since the announcement of AUKUS in 2021, partners have consistently offered comprehensive updates at every regular Board meeting, all of which are accessible online. We encourage China and other nations to review these updates and to raise any additional questions directly with AUKUS partners, rather than monopolising the Board’s valuable time on matters that have already been addressed.

We remain committed to maintaining open and transparent dialogue regarding AUKUS, and we will continue to update the Board under “Any Other Business”, whilst welcoming further reports from the Director General when he deems them appropriate.

Thank you, Chair.