Wes Streeting Delivers Keynote Address at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Good morning to you all.

I appreciate that warm introduction. It’s a pleasure to bring a bit of cheer, something not commonly associated with Defence Ministers. However, I cannot guarantee that this sunny outlook will persist when I delve into the current threat landscape we face.

Your description of my governmental experience is quite amusing; depending on one’s perspective, I might be viewed as a significant contributor to the fiscal pressures within the two departments I have led. Some of my friends at the Treasury might consider me a key player in the budgetary challenges we encounter.

During previous spending review negotiations, I was referred to as the Katniss Everdeen of the process. This is one of the reasons the Prime Minister sought my leadership as Defence Secretary at a time when we are increasing investment but must strive for even more.

The Importance of UK-US Collaboration

It is wonderful to be here this morning, at least according to the clock—my body is still adjusting to the time difference. As I arrive in Washington, one thing is abundantly clear: there has rarely been a more critical time for Britain and America to unite, to think boldly, and to act decisively. I extend my gratitude to our hosts for assembling such a diverse array of expertise in this room.

The most severe threats of the 20th century are re-emerging, now equipped with the technologies of the 21st. It remains uncertain whether this century will be marked by freedom or tyranny. Russia is conducting warfare in Europe, while our adversaries continually test and provoke us. The threats we face are escalating and drawing closer to our shores, and the nature of warfare is being fundamentally transformed in real-time.

Britain and America have never been content to merely observe history as it unfolds. During defining moments, we have played an instrumental role in shaping its trajectory. Today, the frontline in the battle for freedom is located in Ukraine. Ukraine did not initiate this conflict; it was President Putin who invaded their nation, not merely four and a half years ago, but over a decade ago with his incursion into Crimea.

The Lessons of History

Our experiences throughout the 20th century have taught us that appeasement is futile—a lesson that has been painfully evident in our dealings with Putin since 2014. I witnessed the grim reality of his imperialism during my visit to Kyiv this summer, where I saw bombed-out shopping centres, makeshift shelters in underground carparks, and children’s toys amidst the rubble of homes obliterated by Putin’s war machine.

For those on this side of the Atlantic, the conflict may seem distant from the everyday lives of ordinary Americans, yet the people of Ukraine are battling for principles that resonate deeply within the finest traditions of American political thought. These principles, which underpin the very foundation of the United States, assert that a free people have the right to shape their own destinies and that no nation should be at the mercy of a more powerful neighbour.

However, our shared history imparts another vital lesson: defending freedom is not merely a matter of principle; it is also a question of national self-interest. Following the Second World War, President Truman and General Marshall recognised that the security of the United States could not be divorced from that of Europe. Together with Britain and our allies, America played a pivotal role in establishing the institutions and alliances that have ensured decades of transatlantic security.

The Stakes of Modern Warfare

The Marshall Plan and the creation of NATO were not acts of mere generosity; they were manifestations of foresight and self-interest. That generation learned through harsh experience that the cost of preserving peace today can be significantly lower than the price of restoring it tomorrow. This lesson remains relevant today.

Ukraine may be thousands of miles from American soil, but if we reward aggression, allowing borders to be redrawn by force and the sovereignty of nations to become negotiable, the repercussions will inevitably extend beyond Ukraine and my continent. Thus, supporting Ukraine is not a matter of choosing between our values and our self-interest; it is an acknowledgment that they are intertwined.

Modern warfare remains as brutal and deadly as ever, yet Ukraine has irrevocably altered the character of conflict. A $650 drone can incapacitate a $4 million tank, while uncrewed vessels costing a mere quarter of a million dollars can sink warships valued at $65 million. The time required to detect and strike targets has been drastically reduced, and new technologies can be deployed in weeks rather than years.

Adapting to Rapid Change

The lesson is clear: military power is no longer merely a contest of who possesses the largest or most expensive equipment. It now hinges on who can innovate swiftly, produce at scale, and leverage comparatively inexpensive technology for devastating military outcomes. Our rivals are merging industrial capabilities with rapid advancements in autonomy, artificial intelligence, drones, as well as cyber and electronic warfare.

Thus, modernisation transcends the mere invention or purchase of new equipment or technology. It is about equipping our military with cost-effective, adaptable, and accessible weaponry as expeditiously as possible. The traditional procurement model, which involved lengthy specifications and complex legal compliance, has become outdated. We now inhabit a world where weapons are designed, developed, and deployed by engineering firms at remarkable speed.

Failure to adapt will not only leave nations behind but will also place them at risk. This necessitates enhancements in productivity and procurement processes. In the UK, we have set ambitious targets to reduce the time taken from concept to contract for new platforms from six years to two. We aim to adapt existing platforms from three years to one and ensure all other acquisitions occur within three months. This is crucial as the advantage increasingly lies with those who can learn, iterate, manufacture, and deploy capabilities swiftly.

Embracing Innovation

Innovation demands that we take risks, learn from failures, and, when necessary, fail quickly and adapt even faster. The private sector accomplishes this daily, yet such a culture is not innate to politics. We operate within an environment where every error is magnified, every setback scrutinised, and every failure may become tomorrow’s headline. In a rapidly changing world, the most perilous words in defence are not ‘we tried and failed’, but rather ‘we’ve always done it this way’.

A new approach is already yielding exciting results. Confronted with an urgent air-defence requirement from Ukraine, rather than a protracted specification process, industry was provided with a concise operational requirement. This allowed room for innovation, leading to the design, development, and delivery of the RAVEN ground-launched missile system within four months, costing less than $25 million for the first eight systems.

Similarly, our SMEs were able to take designs for one-way attack drones from concept to flight in just three months, with systems reaching the frontline in Ukraine within a year. By deliberately limiting technical requirements, companies were encouraged to experiment, learn from mistakes, and iterate swiftly, resulting in the rapid acquisition of essential and effective defence tools that have saved lives and enabled Ukraine to confront Putin’s aggression.

Learning from the Frontlines

Instead of adhering to outdated practices, we embraced the immediate challenges before us, pushing the boundaries of defence innovation and maintaining an edge over our adversaries. Additionally, we are learning in real-time from the conflict in Ukraine, which necessitates much shorter feedback loops. Ukraine’s revolutionary military AI platform, Avengers Lab, exemplifies this concept by taking combat data from the frontline and transforming it into hyper-accurate algorithms that significantly enhance situational awareness and target identification on the battlefield.

The UK now has access to this invaluable data. Universities, researchers, and tech firms are collaborating to co-develop battle-winning AI capabilities based on these insights. This serves a more profound purpose: not only to analyse the lessons of Ukraine post-war but to link battlefield experience to our innovation systems while the lessons remain pertinent. The evolution of our relationship during the war reflects a shift from training Ukrainians to being trained by them.

Seizing a Unique Opportunity

The transformation of modern warfare presents an extraordinary opportunity for Britain and America. It allows us not only to renew our defence partnership but also to help establish an alliance capable of addressing the challenges of the 21st century. Our partnership has been forged through generations of shared history, common purpose, and joint sacrifice, and I firmly believe it remains the strongest and most enduring bilateral relationship in the world.

However, its future cannot rely solely on nostalgia. Collaboration in defence innovation can elevate our partnership to new heights for the remainder of this century. We have consistently demonstrated that collaboration between the UK and the US outpaces our rivals in innovation. This is hardly surprising, given that we are home to some of the brightest minds, finest universities, and most creative companies globally.

By pooling our resources, we can lead the way in developing defence technologies, including drones, uncrewed vessels, advanced fighter jets, and the application of AI. If the last century of warfare was characterised by our soldiers standing shoulder to shoulder on the battlefield, the next can be defined by our scientists, engineers, and businesses working collaboratively in our laboratories, research institutes, and factories.

Manufacturing for the Future

Yet, this ambition extends beyond merely out-innovating our adversaries; we must also out-produce them. The