UK Delivers Key Statement on Ukraine at IAEA Board of Governors Meeting – September 2026

Chair,

We commend the Agency for its ongoing efforts to monitor the situation and mitigate the risk of a nuclear accident in Ukraine. We particularly acknowledge the Agency’s success in facilitating the recent ceasefire, which was essential for restoring off-site power to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

However, this development should raise significant concerns.

Nuclear facilities should never rely on temporary ceasefires to carry out crucial repairs. They should not depend on emergency diesel generators to maintain safety systems. Most importantly, they must operate with sufficient resilience so that fuel deliveries do not become critical for daily nuclear safety.

Unfortunately, this is the precarious situation that Russia has imposed at ZNPP. Although off-site power has been restored, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently warned that without this power, the plant could face a station blackout, highlighting the fragility of the current circumstances.

The margin for error is diminishing, and with each meeting of this Board, it continues to shrink.

Concerns Raised by the Director General’s Report

Chair,

The Director General’s report is profoundly concerning. Developments over the past three months indicate a persistent erosion of the defensive layers that underpin nuclear safety.

During this reporting period, ZNPP experienced ten instances of lost off-site power, bringing the total to twenty-six since the onset of the conflict. Alarmingly, over one-third of all such occurrences throughout the conflict have taken place in the last three months alone.

This statistic should prompt serious reflection. It is challenging to reconcile this with Russia’s repeated assertions of commitment to nuclear safety. If these claims were sincere, we would anticipate an improvement in the situation.

Instead, the appeals from this Board continue to be disregarded, and the trend is clear: resilience is diminishing while risk is escalating.

Decline in Emergency Preparedness

The deterioration does not end there. The report notes a significant decline in the systems required to detect and respond to a nuclear emergency.

At the beginning of the reporting period, more than two-thirds of off-site radiation monitoring stations around ZNPP were transmitting data. By mid-July, fewer than one-third remained operational.

In straightforward terms, if a nuclear emergency were to occur tomorrow, there would be a greater risk that it would be detected later, comprehended later, and responded to later. This is particularly alarming at a site where conditions remain dangerously unstable, and it should be a cause for concern for us all.

Growing Threat of Nuclear Accident

Chair,

More than four years into Russia’s occupation of ZNPP, the threat of an accident is only escalating. Yet, how does Russia respond?

It disregards the repeated calls from this Board and the General Conference.

It discusses nuclear safety in this forum while neglecting the very standards it purports to uphold.

It attempts to deflect responsibility for a situation of its own making while continuing to portray itself as a guardian of nuclear safety.

This Board must not become desensitised to warnings that grow increasingly urgent with each report. We must not normalise a situation that Russia has created, perpetuated, and refuses to resolve.

No amount of rhetoric can obscure the reality: Russia has generated this risk, and it must alleviate it by withdrawing from ZNPP and restoring control of the plant to Ukrainian authorities.

Thank you, Chair.